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CoMID: Context-based Multi-Invariant Detection
for Monitoring Cyber-Physical Software
Yi Qin, Tao Xie, Chang Xu, Angello Astorga, and Jian Lu
Abstract—Cyber-physical software continually interacts with
its physical environment for adaptation in order to deliver smart
services. However, the interactions can be subject to various
errors when the software’s assumption on its environment no
longer holds, thus leading to unexpected misbehavior or even
failure. To address this problem, one promising way is to conduct
runtime monitoring of invariants, so as to prevent cyber-physical
software from entering such errors (a.k.a. abnormal states). To
effectively detect abnormal states, we in this article present
an approach, named Context-based Multi-Invariant Detection
(CoMID), which consists of two techniques: context-based trace
grouping and multi-invariant detection. The former infers contexts
to distinguish different effective scopes for CoMID’s derived
invariants, and the latter conducts ensemble evaluation of
multiple invariants to detect abnormal states. We experimentally
evaluate CoMID on real-world cyber-physical software. The
results show that CoMID achieves a 5.7–28.2% higher true-
positive rate and a 6.8–37.6% lower false-positive rate in
detecting abnormal states, as compared with state-of-the-art
approaches (i.e., Daikon and ZoomIn). When deployed in field
tests, CoMID’s runtime monitoring improves the success rate of
cyber-physical software in its task executions by 15.3–31.7%.
Index Terms—cyber-physical software, abnormal state detec-
tion, invariant generation
I. INTRODUCTION
C
YBER-PHYSICAL software programs (or cyber-
physical programs) continually interact with their
external physical environments to provide context-aware
adaptive functionalities. Examples of such programs include
those running on robot cars [1]–[3], unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) [4]–[6], and humanoid robots [7]–[9]. Cyber-physical
programs keep sensing environmental changes, making
decisions based on their pre-programmed logics, and then
taking physical actions to cope with the sensed changes. The
three steps, namely, sensing, decision-making, and action-
taking, form an interaction loop between a cyber-physical
program and its running environment. Each pass of such an
interaction loop is referred to as an iteration.
To improve the productivity and cope with infinite kinds
of environmental dynamics, software developers often hold
certain assumptions on typical scenarios, where their cyber-
physical programs are supposed to run. For example, a robot
controlled by a cyber-physical program walks in an indoor
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environment, where the floor is supposed to be firm but not
slippery, and the space is supposed not to contain any fasting-
moving obstacle. However, it is challenging for developers
to precisely specify what can be considered as “not firm”
or “slippery”. Besides, it is also challenging for users to
determine whether a specific scenario meets such vague
assumptions, and when the assumptions no longer hold (e.g.,
when the scenario’s humidity has largely reduced its floor’s
friction force). As such, a cyber-physical program is easily
subject to runtime errors in its deployment [11]–[15], and
then causes misbehavior or even failure (e.g., a robot falling
down and making itself damaged). Therefore, there is a strong
need for preventing cyber-physical programs from entering
such errors, which indicate the violation of their implicit
assumptions on running environments.
One promising way is to conduct runtime monitoring of
pre-specified invariants, which represent the properties that
have to be satisfied during executions, to check whether
a cyber-physical program’s execution is safe. Being safe
indicates that the program’s execution will not lead to a
failure, if no intervention is taken, but just following the
logics in the program. However, specifying effective invariants
is challenging. For example, one may specify invariants as
the negation of failure conditions, e.g., not crashing of a
UAV or falling down of a humanoid robot. However, such
invariants are not that useful, since when they are violated
(i.e., corresponding failure conditions are evaluated to be true),
it is already too late for a concerned program not to fail.
Another alternative is to specify invariants for latent erroneous
states (a.k.a. abnormal states). Then one is potentially able
to predict future failures, and prevent a concerned program
from taking originally-planned actions, which would otherwise
have caused failures. For example, if a robot finds its program
execution violating the invariants representing safe executions,
it can decide to stop further exploring the current scenario and
plan another path to its destination. This resolution action can
help it avoid unexpected danger in the original scenario.
There are two major ways of specifying invariants for
detecting abnormal states: using manually specified properties
or using automatically generated invariants. For the former,
developers need domain knowledge to understand what
can constitute abnormal states, and derive corresponding
properties. This manual process is challenging, especially
when a cyber-physical program and its running environment
are non-trivial [4]. On the other hand, automated invariant
generation [16]–[19] provides a promising alternative. Despite
varying in details, these approaches follow a general pro-
cess [20] as follows. When a subject program is running,
2they collect its execution trace in terms of program states
(e.g., variable values) at program locations of interest (e.g.,
entry and exit points of each executed method). Then from
a set of such collected safe traces (i.e., no led failure), the
approaches derive invariants for different program locations
based on predefined templates. These invariants can then be
used with runtime monitoring to predict the program’s future
executions to be safe (i.e., passing, for no invariant violation)
or not (i.e., failing, for any invariant violation). Here, passing
implies that the program runs safely with its assumptions on
the environment holding, and failing implies that the program
could soon fail since its assumptions on the environment no
longer hold now.
However, using automatically generated invariants for
runtime monitoring is still challenging. One major problem
is how to balance between general and specific invariants. If
an invariant for a program location is too general, using it for
runtime monitoring can miss the detection of abnormal states,
resulting in false negatives. For example, relaxing invariants
to cater for various firm floors can accidently include firm but
slippery floors, breaking the robot program’s assumptions on
its running environment. On the other hand, if an invariant
is too specific, using it for runtime monitoring can detect
many “abnormal” states even in safe executions, resulting in
false positives. For example, restricting invariants to specific
firm floors (e.g., in brick or wood material) can cause false
warnings when the robot walks on other firm but not slippery
floors, where the program’s execution is still safe.
Even worse, this balancing problem can be further exacer-
bated by two characteristics of cyber-physical programs:
Iterative execution. Cyber-physical programs are featured
by repeated iterations of a sensing, decision-making, and
action-taking loop. Then a program location for which
an invariant is generated can be executed multiple times
during multiple iterations for dealing with different contexts
(i.e., various situations in handling environmental dynamics).
During these different iterations, a program’s definition of
safe behavior with respect to each context varies across the
iterations. Overlooking these contexts, generated invariants
would be overgeneralized, such that the detection of abnormal
states can be missed. On the other hand, generating invariants
by sticking to any specific context would also make the
invariants overly fragile to other contexts of safe executions,
causing false warnings.
Uncertain interaction. Cyber-physical programs could also
face massive false alarms due to uncertainty [21], when they
use automatically generated invariants to detect abnormal
states. For example, even if one places a robot at the same
position across different iterations, its sensors can possibly
report different values for its position due to uncertainty (as
an inherent nature of sensing). These different input values
are then propagated to a program location of interest for
deriving invariants, causing this location to own variable
values different from those in other safe executions also from
the same position. Then, overlooking the impact of such
uncertainty, runtime monitoring with generated invariants can
easily report false alarms: invariant violation is actually caused
by inaccurate sensing, not due to a program’s assumptions not
holding on its environment.
To address these challenges, we in this article present an
approach, named Context-based Multiple Invariants Detection
(CoMID), to automatically generating invariants and using
them for effective detection of abnormal states for cyber-
physical programs. CoMID addresses the preceding challenges
by its two techniques, namely, context-based trace grouping
and multi-invariant detection:
Context-based trace grouping. The first technique groups
execution traces collected from different iterations in a cyber-
physical program’s execution according to their contexts. Then
the execution traces in each group include only those from
the iterations that share the same program and environmental
contexts. Here, program context refers to a program’s
statements executed during one iteration, and environmental
context refers to the values of environmental attributes as
sensed by the program during the iteration. This technique
conducts execution trace grouping by clustering, based on the
similarities of corresponding contexts between each pair of
execution traces. Then, for each group the technique generates
invariants based only on the execution traces in that group.
Since the execution traces in a group share a common program
context and environmental context, the two contexts together
specify the effective scope for the invariants generated for this
group. We name it the group’s generated invariants’ context,
which is used for runtime monitoring: an invariant is valid to
check (i.e., within the effective scope), only when its context
is close enough to that of a program’s current iteration. In
this case, the iteration is named context-sharing iteration. By
doing so, CoMID aims to both avoid missing the detection
of abnormal states and avoid reporting false alarms due to
checking an invariant in a non-context-sharing iteration.
Multi-invariant detection. The second technique addresses
the robustness problem for invariants when their relied
execution traces contain noisy values due to uncertainty.
Instead of generating a single invariant from all execution
traces in a group, this technique generates multiple ones,
based on different subsets sampled from the execution
traces in the group. Then it uses an estimation function
to decide the detection of abnormal states based on multi-
invariant evaluation results. The function measures the ratio
of violated invariants against all invariants with respect to
their corresponding groups, and then takes the uncertainty
in program-environment interactions into consideration, to
decide whether the invariant violation indicates the detection
of abnormal states or is simply caused by uncertainty. This
idea has been inspired by ensemble learning [22], which
uses multiple models to improve the prediction performance,
as compared with the conventional prediction based on one
constituent model alone.
We experimentally evaluate our CoMID approach on three
real-world cyber-physical programs: a 4-rotor unmanned aerial
vehicle (4-UAV) [23], a 6-rotor unmanned aerial vehicle (6-
UAV), and a NAO humanoid robot [7]. We compare CoMID
with two state-of-the-art approaches on automated invariant
generation: Daikon [16] and ZoomIn [24]. The experimental
results show CoMID’s effectiveness: it achieves a 5.7–28.2%
higher true-positive rate and a 6.8–37.6% lower false-positive
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Fig. 1. A NAO robot controlled by a cyber-physical program
rate in detecting abnormal states for the three programs’
executions; when deployed for runtime monitoring to prevent
unexpected failures, CoMID improves the success rate of the
three programs by 15.3–31.7% in their task executions.
In summary, this article makes the following contributions:
• The CoMID approach to automatically generating in-
variants and detecting abnormal states for cyber-physical
programs’ executions.
• The context-based trace grouping technique to refine
invariant generation with respect to different contexts.
• The multi-invariant detection technique to address the
impact of uncertainty in program-environment interactions
on invariant-based runtime monitoring.
• An experimental evaluation with real-world cyber-
physical programs and comparison of CoMID with state-
of-the-art invariant generation approaches.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.
Section II uses a motivating example to illustrate our target
problem and its challenges. Section III gives an overview
of our CoMID approach and then elaborates on its two
techniques. Section IV presents our evaluation of CoMID with
three real-world cyber-physical programs and compares it with
existing approaches. Section V discusses the related work in
recent years, and finally Section VI concludes this article and
discusses future work.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
In this section, we use a motivating example to illustrate
our target problem and its challenges. Consider our aforemen-
tioned NAO humanoid robot controlled by a cyber-physical
program P . Suppose that the robot is exploring an indoor
area, as illustrated in Fig. 1. For the sake of quality and
productivity, developers can hold implicit assumptions on the
scenarios where the robot is supposed to walk, e.g., a room
with a firm and not slippery floor. Then, developers proceed
to design corresponding exploration strategies for the robot,
e.g., walking slowly and balancing by raising its arms with
certain angles. These strategies are for ensuring the robot to
walk safely on a floor made of several common materials, e.g.,
wood, as shown in Fig. 1-a, and brick, as shown in Fig. 1-
b. In the following, we analyze what challenges the runtime
monitoring with invariants can encounter, in order to prevent
the robot from entering abnormal states.
Program P uses readings of two pressure sensors installed
on the robot’s two feet to measure whether the robot has
leaned toward left or right and decide whether it has to balance
the robot in its walking. The measurement is conducted by
calculating the difference between the two sensors’ readings,
preleft and preright. P then decides one of the robot’s arms
according to which direction the robot is leaning toward, and
calculates the height the decided arm should be raised to.
Suppose that variable angle in P controls the height value,
and then it becomes a key factor that decides whether the robot
can properly balance itself in walking. Developers can design
various logics to calculate the angle value, but they more or
less depend on the material comprising the floor.
One outstanding challenge is that developers can hardly
specify proper angle values. They typically follow a trial-
and-error process to calculate plausible angle values. If lucky
enough, they can design the calculation logics that seemingly
work for several types of floor material. Even so, users may
still not be able to decide whether a specific scenario is safe
for the robot to walk into (i.e., whether the calculation logics
still work), or when a previously safe scenario becomes no
longer safe (e.g., when the scenario gradually evolves). As
mentioned earlier, this is the right place for runtime monitoring
with invariants plays an important role. In the following, we
explain how to generate invariants for the angle variable and
use them to decide whether P ’s execution is safe for the
current scenario.
Most existing invariant generation approaches work sim-
ilarly. Now we generate an invariant for variable angle at
the entry point of method motion.angleMove (names,
angle, timeLists), which is the key method for deciding
how to raise an arm for balancing the robot. We first collect
several safe execution traces (e.g., tr1, tr2, and tr3) of program
P , in which angle’s corresponding variable-value pairs are
tr1: {angle = 48}, tr2: {angle = 52}, and tr3: {angle =
55}. Following a predefined template (e.g., varX ≤ C), we
can derive an invariant like “angle ≤ 55”, satisfying all the
three traces. This invariant suggests that proper angle values
at this program location should not exceed 55. Then later when
P controls the robot and finds its collected angle value at the
same program location to be 60, the runtime monitoring could
decide that P ’s execution is not safe. Technically, it reports that
the current execution enters an abnormal state, i.e., classified
as failing.
However, as mentioned earlier, invariant generation has to
balance between general and specific invariants. The preceding
invariant “angle ≤ 55” has relaxed its condition on proper
values for the angle variable to cater for all the three
execution traces, although these values could be from different
scenarios. Then using this invariant can potentially misclassify
an unsafe execution with an angle value of 53 for the scenario
experienced in tr1 as passing. On the other hand, if one derives
the invariant from two execution traces, tr1 and tr2, only (e.g.,
“angle ≤ 52”), but checks it against the execution of tr3 from
4another scenario. Then the runtime monitoring can be too strict
and would misclassify that execution as failing.
The nature of cyber-physical programs exacerbates the
invariant-balancing problem. For example, a cyber-physical
program can encounter multiple iterations, and not all
iterations share the same context. Suppose that a robot is
walking in a scenario connected with different types of floor
material (e.g., wood, brick, and others) and placed with
different types of obstacle (e.g., high, low, round, and others).
Such a scenario implies different environmental contexts. Even
on the same floor, the robot may take different strategies to
handle different obstacle situations. Such variety of strategies
implies different program contexts. Without distinguishing
these contexts, invariant generation can be easily over-
generalized (e.g., deriving invariants to cater for all executions
traces), and invariant violation can also be easily over-triggered
(e.g., checking invariants in a context different from the
context from which the invariants are derived).
A cyber-physical program’s uncertain interactions with its
environment similarly worsen the invariant-balancing problem.
Inaccurate sensing makes derived invariants imprecise due to
random noises in sensor readings, and the imprecision can
cause both false-warning and missing-warning problems. A
naive way is to relax the condition in such an invariant by
allowing some extent of error, e.g., a delta of ±5 added to
proper values for the angle variable. However, this way is
quite ad hoc, and can also easily aggravate the false-warning
and missing-warning problems.
These limitations of existing approaches on automated
invariant generation motivate us to develop our CoMID
approach, particularly focused on the invariant generation
and runtime monitoring for cyber-physical programs. CoMID
aims to distinguish different contexts for effective invariant
generation and address the impact of uncertainty for effective
runtime monitoring with generated invariants. We elaborate on
our CoMID’s methodology in the next section.
III. CONTEXT-BASED MULTI-INVARIANT DETECTION
The input of our CoMID approach is a cyber-physical
program P and its running environment E (conceptually). We
consider E as a black-box program without having to know
how E exactly works. Due to the interactions between P and
E, P ’s output OP becomes E’s input IE , and P ’s input IP
for its next iteration comes from E’s output OE based on
E’s internal logics (e.g., physical laws and domain rules). For
invariant generation purposes, we assume the availability of a
set of failure conditions (e.g., crashing of a UAV or falling
down of a humanoid robot) for deciding whether a cyber-
physical program’s execution has already failed, as existing
work does.
CoMID works in four steps: (1) it first executes program
P in environment E to collect safe execution traces, i.e.,
no failure condition triggered (Step 1: trace collection); (2)
it then groups iterations from the collected execution traces
into multiple sets of context-sharing iterations, based on
their program and environmental contexts (Step 2: iteration
grouping); (3) after that, it generates multiple invariants for
each group (Step 3: multi-invariant generation); (4) finally,
it uses the generated invariants to detect abnormal states
for program P ’s future executions (Step 4: abnormal state
detection). Fig. 2 illustrates CoMID’s workflow.
In the first two steps, besides collecting traditional artifacts
(e.g., arguments and return values for each executed method),
CoMID also analyzes program and environmental contexts
for each iteration. Regarding the program context, CoMID
records what statements are executed in an iteration. Regarding
the environmental context, CoMID records attribute values
associated with environmentE. CoMID recognizes P ’s system
calls related to environmental sensing, and uses these calls
to record attribute values at the beginning of each iteration.
CoMID uses the program context to distinguish an iteration’s
specific strategy in handling external situations, and uses the
environmental context to distinguish different situations P is
facing in a specific iteration.
In the last two steps, CoMID generates and checks multi-
invariants to address the impact of uncertainty on deciding
whether a specific invariant violation is a convincing indication
that the current execution is no longer safe. CoMID leverages
previous work (e.g., Daikon [16]) for invariant derivation by
feeding different sets of sampled iterations.
In the following, we elaborate on CoMID’s details.
A. Context-based Trace Grouping (Steps 1 and 2)
Trace collection. In the first step, CoMID executes program
P multiple times in environment E, and collects P ’s trace
information from its executions that do not trigger any
failure condition. For each collected execution trace, CoMID
determines the boundary (i.e., beginning and ending) of each
iteration in the trace, by recognizing input points (i.e., system
calls related to environmental sensing, e.g., for acquiring
pressure sensing values on the NAO robot’s feet) and output
points (i.e., system calls related to physical actions, e.g.,
raising the NAO robot’s arms) in P . Following the sensing,
decision-making, and action-taking loop, an iteration starts
from the first program location where P takes its sensing
input from E, and ends before the location where it finishes
its physical actions in this round and is about to sense the
input for the next round. For saving the cost, CoMID records
values of program variables only at entry and exit points of
the methods executed in each iteration.
To distinguish different iterations, CoMID also records
program and environmental contexts for each iteration.
For the program context, CoMID records the statements
executed in each iteration through program instrumentation.
For the environmental context, CoMID records values of
environmental attributes using their involved system calls at
the beginning of each iteration (i.e., once CoMID recognizes
a new iteration).
Formally, we use segment to represent the collected
information for each iteration in program P ’s execution. A
segment abstracts P ’s execution state during an iteration. We
use sgi to represent P ’s state for its i-th iteration: sgi = (Pcxt,
Ecxt, M1, M2, ..., Mj), where
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Fig. 2. CoMID’s workflow
1) Pcxt represents the i-th iteration’s program context,
which is a set of identities (ids) of statements executed
in the iteration.
2) Ecxt represents the i-th iteration’s environmental con-
text, which is a set of name-value pairs for sensing
variables in P .
3) M1, M2, ..., Mj represent a sequence of methods
executed in the i-th iteration, each of which contains
a method’s name, arguments, and return value.
Iteration grouping. In the second step, CoMID groups
iterations (segments) from collected execution traces, so that
each group contains only context-sharing ones. Here, contexts
refer to program and environmental contexts recorded in the
first step.
CoMID analyzes environmental contexts Ecxt recorded
in segments to discover common patterns shared by it-
erations. It builds a set of all environmental contexts
ENV CONTEXT , and conducts the k-means clustering
algorithm [25] to form different clusters. For the performance
consideration, CoMID considers only environmental attributes
of numeric types in the clustering. It uses a normalized
Euclidean metric to measure the distance between each
pair of environmental contexts. Given two environmen-
tal contexts Ecxt A (a A1, a A2, ..., a An) and Ecxt B
(a B1, a B2, ..., a Bn), their distance dis(Ecxt A,Ecxt B)
is calculated as
dis(Ecxt A,Ecxt B) =
∑n
i=1
√
(a Ai−a Bi)2
s2
i
,
where s2i is the variance of all values of Ecxt’s i-th attributes
in the ENV CONTEXT set.
The k-means clustering algorithm [25] requires setting a
suitable value for parameter k, which decides the maximal size
of each formed cluster of environmental contexts. Generally,
a small k value can make derived clusters more specific,
but it could also increase noises in later classification [26].
Therefore, we choose the grid search [27], a traditional way
of conducting parameter optimization in machine learning
algorithms, to decide the most suitable value for parameter
k. Intuitively, the grid search conducts cross-validation on a
set of candidate values for the parameter to be optimized, and
selects the one with the best performance.
We initially use 30 candidate values for parameter k, from
1% of the total number of collected environmental contexts
to 30%, increasing with a pace of 1%. Then we conduct 10-
fold cross-validation to decide the most suitable k value. We
randomly divide the ENV CONTEXT set into ten disjoint
subsets of the same size. Nine subsets are merged for training
(i.e., training set) and the remaining one is for validation
(i.e., testing set). For each candidate k value, we conduct
its corresponding clustering on the training set, resulting in
multiple clusters of environmental contexts. With respect to
these clusters, the environmental contexts from the testing set
are then classified into them. Accordingly, we calculate an
average deviation value to measure the performance associated
with the specific k value. Let an environmental context from
the testing set be Ecxt T , and its classified cluster be C
(Ecxt 1, Ecxt 2, ...,Ecxt j). Then contextEcxt T ’s deviation
value div(Ecxt T ) is calculated as
div(Ecxt T ) =
1
j
∑j
i=1 dis(Ecxt T,Ecxt i).
The average deviation value for k is the averaged deviation
values of all environmental contexts from the testing set. One
would expect this value to be minimized, and thus CoMID
selects the k value with the smallest average deviation value
after comparing all candidate values. In our field tests of the
NAO robot and UAV subjects used later in our evaluation
(Section IV), we observe that the selected k value ranges from
17% to 22% of the total number of collected environmental
contexts with their corresponding performance being similar.
Therefore, we select 20% of the total number as the k value
used in CoMID to simplify its implementation and evaluation.
With the k value set for the k-means clustering, CoMID
derives initial clusters for collected environmental contexts,
and their owning segments are also clustered accordingly.
Then CoMID refines these initial clusters of segments based
on their program contexts, by measuring the similarity of
program contexts between segments in each cluster. CoMID
uses the Jaccard similarity index [28] to calculate the Degree
of Similarity (DoS) value between each pair of program
contexts. Let Pcxt sg be segment sg’s program context (i.e.,
a set of statement ids). Then for two given segments sgA
and sgB , the DoS value between their program contexts
DoS(Pcxt sgA, Pcxt sgB) is calculated as
DoS(Pcxt sgA, Pcxt sgB) =
|Pcxt sgA∩Pcxt sgB |
|Pcxt sgA∪Pcxt sgB |
.
Then the DoS value between a pair of program contexts
ranges from 0 to 1. CoMID considers two segments to have
the same program context if the DoS value of their program
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n
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timeLists 1.0
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stm30, stm31, stm34
…
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…
P :
1
2
th
iteratio
n
…
motion.angleMove
(names, angle, timeLists)
…
Method name: 
motion.angleMove
Arguments: 
names   LShoulder
angle     55
timeLists 1.0
Environmental context:
(24.1, 19.6, 22.7)
Program context: 
stm30, stm31, stm34
Segment of the 8th iteration segA
8
Segment of the 12th iteration segA
12
Fig. 3. Illustration of Step 1: Trace collection
contexts is no less than 0.8. This reference value is set by
following existing work [24]. Nevertheless, we also study
the impact of different DoS threshold values on CoMID’s
performance in our later evaluation (Section IV).
Based on this similarity measurement on program contexts,
CoMID refines the initial clusters of segments. If two segments
in one cluster have the same program context, they are still
together in that cluster. Otherwise, they are separated into two
clusters. This separation process iterates until no cluster can
be refined. Then the final result is a set of groups, each of
which contains only segments with the same environmental
and program contexts. We also say that each group contains
context-sharing iterations.
Example. Consider in our robot example method
motion.angleMove(names, angle, timeLists).
Fig. 3 illustrates CoMID’s recorded information for the 8th
and 12th iterations in an execution trace trA. The segment
representing the 8th iteration, denoted as seg8A, is shown in
the upper dashed box, and the segment representing the 12th
iteration is shown in the lower box. For each segment, its
upper block lists the concerned iteration’s environmental and
program contexts, respectively, and its lower block lists the
information for methods executed in this iteration (here we
show one method for illustration). We use a tuple, e.g., (22.3,
20.8, 26.3), to represent the values of sensed environmental
attributes, e.g., for the pressure on the robot’s left foot, that
on the right foot, and the robot’s distance to its front-facing
obstacle, respectively. We use “stm” followed by a number,
e.g., “stm30”, to represent the id of a statement executed in
the concerned iteration.
Fig. 4 illustrates how the iterations in three execution
traces (trA, trB , and trC ) are grouped according their
environmental and program contexts. CoMID first derives
initial clusters (Fig. 4-a) according to environmental contexts
of the iterations, and cluster C1 includes six iterations (seg
8
A
trA
segA
8
segA
12
segB
21
segB
30
trB
segC
15
segC
20
trC
C2
C1
Clusters of environmental contexts
Environmental  context: 
(20.3, 24.6,  22.4)
Program context:
stm30
stm31
stm34
Environmental 
context: 
(24.4, 26.7,  24.8)
Program context: 
stm30
stm49
stm50
Environmental 
context: 
(25.7, 23.2, 14.3)
Program context: 
stm30
stm48
stm49
Environmental  context: 
(24.2,  22.9, 18.7)
Program context:
stm30
stm31
stm36
(a) Deriving clusters by environmental context
segB
21
segB
30
segA
8
segA
12
segC
15
segC
20 Derived initial clusters of 
segments with the same 
environmental contexts
Final groups of context-
sharing iterations
segC
20
segC
15
segA
8
segA
12segB
30
segB
21
Further refining clusters by program context
(b) Refining clusters by program context to form final groups
Fig. 4. Illustration of Step 2: Iteration grouping
and seg12A from trA, seg
21
B and seg
30
B from trB , and seg
15
C
and seg20C from trC ). We show only their environmental and
program contexts for illustration. CoMID then calculates DoS
values for program contexts of the six iterations, and refines
the C1 cluster into two final groups (Fig. 4-b). One larger
group contains four iterations (seg8A, seg
12
A , seg
15
C , and seg
20
C )
from execution traces trA and trC , and the other smaller
group contains two iterations (seg21B and seg
30
B ) from trace
trB . Such refinement result is due to their DoS calculations,
e.g., DoS(seg8A, seg
15
C ) = 1.0, DoS(seg
8
A, seg
21
B ) = 0.2, and
DoS(seg21B , seg
15
C ) = 0.2, and so on.
B. Multi-Invariant Detection (Steps 3 and 4)
Multi-invariant generation. After context-based trace
grouping, CoMID obtains multiple groups of context-sharing
iterations in terms of segments. CoMID feeds the segments in
each group to the Daikon [16] engine for deriving invariants
specific to this group.
As mentioned earlier, CoMID needs to address the impact
of uncertainty on invariant generation, so as to suppress the
negative consequences of inaccurate sensing values. To do so,
CoMID uses different subsets from each group of segments for
7deriving invariants, which are later used for collective checking
in the runtime monitoring against uncertainty. Generally,
one can freely decide the number of such subsets, and
CoMID chooses four (i.e., 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% of
the total number of segments in a group) for avoiding high
computational and monitoring overheads.
Then, besides the one invariant (i.e., principal invariant) for
the universal set (i.e., a whole group of segments), CoMID
generates four invariants for the four subsets, respectively.
These five invariants are named as an invariant family, with
respect to each supported invariant template and each executed
method requiring invariant generation in the group. Since each
invariant family is associated with a specific group of context-
sharing iterations, the group’s contexts are also referred as
the invariant family’s context. An invariant family’s context
specifies the situations under which the invariants in the family
are suitable for checking, thus deciding abnormal states for
concerned programs.
Abnormal-state detection. Now CoMID has generated
a set of invariant families for runtime monitoring of each
program location of interest. Different from existing work,
CoMID chooses to check only those invariant families whose
contexts are the same as that of the current iteration in
a program’s execution. Here, “same” is decided by the
comparisons of both program and environmental contexts: (1)
the DoS value between a pair of program contexts no less than
0.8 (Section III.A), and (2) the environmental context of the
current iteration is classified into the same cluster as that of
the considered invariant family.
After selecting suitable invariant families for checking,
CoMID then needs to decide whether an invariant violation
in the runtime monitoring is simply caused by uncertainty
or indicates the detection of a real abnormal state. CoMID
uses an estimation function to ensemble the evaluation results
of invariant checking across multiple iterations, in order to
suppress the impact of uncertainty on the decision. The design
of the estimation function is based on two intuitions:
1) The possibility that an invariant violation or satisfaction
is caused by uncertainty relates to the number of
segments that have been used for deriving the invariant
under checking.
2) The impact of uncertainty on invariant checking can
be suppressed by examining checking results across
multiple consecutive iterations.
Based on these two intuitions, the estimation function
assigns a weight to each invariant violation or satisfaction.
The weight assignment is designed as follows:
1) For a violated invariant inv1, the more segments are used
for deriving it, the less possibility that inv1’s violation
is caused by uncertainty, since inv1 is inclined to be
general.
2) For a satisfied invariant inv2, the more segments are
used for deriving it, the less possibility that inv2’s
satisfaction indicates the current execution to be passing,
since satisfying a general invariant is natural.
Recall that CoMID makes five subsets for each group of
segments (from 20% to 100% of the total size, with a pace of
20%), and generates invariants with respect to each of these
subsets. Then given a subset of segments and its associated
size ratio p (i.e., 20%, 40%, ..., or 100%), CoMID sets the
weight assigned for the violation of one invariant generated
from this subset to be p, and that for the satisfaction to be
−(1−p). Such a weight value intuitively models the likelihood
whether an execution is failing or passing: a positive value
suggests failing, while a negative value suggests passing, and
its absolute value indicates the confidence.
Formally, consider an invariant family INV = {invi}, 1 ≤
i ≤ k. Let the invariant-checking result for invi at iteration j
be r
j
i , where 1 denotes invariant satisfaction and −1 denotes
violation. Let the size ratio associated with invariant invi be pi
(from its corresponding segment subset). Then the estimation
function returns for INV at iteration j as follows:
EST (INV )j =
∑k
i=1{
pi∑
k
x=1
px
, if r
j
i = −1;
− 1−pi∑k
x=1
(1−px)
, if r
j
i = 1}.
EST (INV )j calculates the sum of weighted checking
results for all invariants in INV for iteration j. The estimation
function then calculates the averaged result for the last w
consecutive iterations (until j):
EST (INV )j−(w−1),j = 1
w
∑j
i=j−(w−1) EST (INV )
i.
This averaged value falls in the range of [−1, 1], and a value
closer to 1 would be a strong indicator of a failing execution
(i.e., having entered an abnormal state). Like existing work,
CoMID needs to set up a threshold for this value to decide
whether a monitored execution is failing. Since this value’s
fluctuation can be largely caused by the uncertainty, we
assume that its distribution corresponds to that of the specific
uncertainty type a cyber-physical program is experiencing.
Then based on the specific uncertainty type (i.e., its error
range [−U , U ] and distribution D), CoMID sets up the
threshold∆ by solving the uncertainty’s C-confidence interval
equation, i.e., Pr(x ∈ [−U ×∆, U ×∆]) = C, where Pr(x)
is the probability function for distribution D). For subjects
such as the NAO robot and UAVs in our later evaluation,
CoMID sets w = 5 and C = 90%. The former suggests 2–3
seconds before CoMID makes a decision, which is sufficient
for such low-speed subjects to take new actions (customizable
by application domains). The latter suggests that CoMID plans
to hold a confidence level of 90% for its made decisions
(also customizable by application domains). In the confidence
interval equation, the probability function for most uncertainty
types follow common models [29], and this facilitates the
equation’s solution. For example, if a specific certain type
follows the uniform distribution, ∆ would be solved to be
0.9; if it follows the normal distribution, ∆ would be 0.65.
By doing so, CoMID sets up the threshold ∆ for deciding
whether an averaged EST value implies the prediction of a
failing execution, i.e., by checking whether the value is larger
than ∆.
Example. Consider in our robot example the variable
angle for method motion.angleMove(names, angle,
timeLists). Fig. 5 illustrates an invariant family for this
variable (showing three invariants for example), generated
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Method name: 
motion.angleMove
Invariants:
angle 
angle 
angle 
Invariants’ context
A group of context-sharing iterations
Method name: 
motion.angleMove
Arguments:
names LShoulder
angle   62
timeLists 1.0
Method name: 
motion.angleMove
Arguments:
names LShoulder
angle   58
timeLists 1.0
A family of invariants
Environmental context:
{ (24.2, 22.9, 22.4), 
(24.2, 22.9, 18.7), …}
Program context:
{ (stm30, stm31, stm34),   
(stm30, stm31, stm36),
…}
Fig. 5. Illustration of Step 3: Multi-invariant generation
Monitored execution trace
45th iteration
46th iteration
ܧܵܶ(ܫܸܰ)ସହ = 1 ܧܵܶ(ܫܸܰ)ସ଺ = െ0.27
Method name: 
motion.angleMove
Invariants:
angle 
angle 
angle 
Environmental context: 
(24.7, 23.4, 21.4)
Program context: 
stm30
stm31
stm34
Method name: 
motion.angleMove
Arguments:
names     LShoulder
angle     67
timeLists 1.0
Environmental context: 
(22.5, 26.7, 16.4)
Program context: 
stm30
stm31
stm36
Method name: 
motion.angleMove
Arguments:
names     LShoulder
angle     55
timeLists 1.0
Invariants’ context
Environmental context:
{ (24.2, 22.9, 22.4), 
(24.2, 22.9, 18.7), …}
Program context:
{ (stm30, stm31, stm34),   
(stm30, stm31, stm36),
  …}
Fig. 6. Illustration of Step 4: Abnormal-state detection
based on one group of context-sharing iterations. In this family,
the principal invariant is “angle ≤ 65, 100%”, indicating
that the robot’s arm should not be raised over 65 degrees in
all cases. This invariant is generated based on all segments
(i.e., 100%) in the concerned group. The other two invariants,
namely, “angle ≤ 52, 20%” and “angle ≤ 58, 50%”,
are generated when only 20% and 50% (randomly sampled)
segments are used. These invariants’ context is also illustrated
in Fig. 5 (from their corresponding group of segments).
Fig. 6 illustrates how CoMID uses the generated invariant
family to detect abnormal states in the runtime monitoring.
Consider the 45th and 46th iterations for a monitored
execution trace (using two consecutive iterations for example,
i.e., w = 2). Suppose that the earlier generated invariant family
shares the same context with both iterations. Then CoMID
checks all three invariants in the family to decide whether the
execution is safe or not. For the 45th iteration, its execution
violates all the three invariants, and thus EST (INV )45 is
calculated to be 1 ( 11.7 +
0.2
1.7 +
0.5
1.7 ). For the 46th iteration,
its execution violates only one invariant “angle ≤ 52, 20%”,
and thus EST (INV )46 is calculated to be −0.27 (− 01.3 +
0.2
1.7 −
0.5
1.3 ). So the averaged value of the estimation function
for the execution consisting of the 45th and 46th iterations
is 0.37 ( 1−0.272 ). If the uncertainty type follows the normal
distribution, CoMID would solve the equation to obtain the
threshold value to be 0.65, as explained earlier. Then the result
(0.37) suggests that the monitored execution is still safe, and
that the several invariant violations encountered in these two
iterations have been possibly caused by uncertainty.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our CoMID approach and
compare it with existing work. We select two state-of-the-
art invariant generation approaches (i.e., Daikon [16] and
ZoomIn [24]) for the comparison. We select three real-
world cyber-physical programs, namely, NAO robot, 4-rotor
UAV, and 6-rotor UAV, as the experimental subjects. For
experimental evaluation, we implement CoMID as a prototype
tool in Java 8 and study the following three research questions:
RQ1: How does CoMID compare with existing work in
detecting abnormal states for cyber-physical programs in
terms of effectiveness and efficiency?
RQ2: How does CoMID’s configuration (e.g., enabling
either or both built-in technique(s) for improving the
generated invariants, and setting up which DoS threshold
value for distinguishing different program contexts in the
invariant generation) affect its effectiveness?
RQ3: How useful is CoMID-based runtime monitoring
by invariant generation and checking for cyber-physical
programs?
A. Experimental Preparation and Subjects
We instrument the three experimental subjects to record
their program variable-value and context information during
their executions. We use Daikon as the baseline engine
for generating invariants from these subjects’ execution
traces. Besides the invariant templates internally supported by
Daikon, we additionally add polygon invariant templates into
Daikon, as suggested by existing work [4], [30] on the runtime
monitoring for cyber-physical programs. For fair comparisons,
the newly-added invariant templates are used by all the three
approaches under the comparison. Note that CoMID is itself
independent of the used invariant templates, and this feature
makes it general to common cyber-physical programs.
The three experimental subjects are from different com-
panies or universities. The commercial NAO robot program
contains 300 LOC (Python-based, with five methods). The
two UAV programs are developed by professional electrical
engineers, and contain 1,500 LOC (Java-based, with 24
methods) and 4,000 LOC (C-based, with 35 methods),
respectively.
B. Experimental Design and Setup
Execution-trace collection. In the experiments, all in-
variants should be generated based on the execution traces
collected from the selected experimental subjects. For ex-
perimental purposes, we design various scenarios for our
9experimental subjects to run with, and collect their execution
traces accordingly. One execution trace is a concrete run of a
subject program in a certain scenario. We decide whether an
execution trace is safe or not (i.e., the oracle) according to its
corresponding program’s behavior and whether its associated
failure conditions have been triggered. For the NAO robot
(subject #1), we decide based on its safety (e.g., the robot
should never fall into the ground or crash into any obstacle)
and liveness (e.g., the robot should not be trapped in a small
area). For the UAVs (subjects #2 and #3), we decide based on
its safety (e.g., a UAV should never fall into the ground or land
outside a destination area) and stableness (e.g., a UAV should
never lose its height quickly in short time or lose its balance
in the air). Besides, if any failure condition is triggered, its
corresponding subject program is directly decided to be unsafe
in its execution. Based on such oracle information (safe or
unsafe), we can later judge whether a specific approach under
comparison gives a correct prediction or not (i.e., passing vs.
safe, and failing vs. unsafe). With the oracle preparation, we
test totally six scenarios and collect 1,200 execution traces for
the three experimental subjects.
For the NAO robot (subject #1), we design a 3m×3m indoor
area (including random obstacles and different floor materials)
for free exploration. We collect a total of 200 execution traces,
including 127 safe ones and 73 unsafe ones. We also build a
simulated space with the same settings by the official NAO’s
emulator Webots [31], and collect 600 execution traces, which
include 454 safe ones and 146 unsafe ones. We note that
the Webots emulator also supports uncertain environmental
sensing internally, and thus its emulated executions are
accompanied with uncertainty naturally. However, both the
subject program and all the approaches under comparison are
unaware of such uncertainty. For ease of presentation, we use
NAO-f and NAO-e to denote the two scenarios, i.e., field setting
and emulation setting for the NAO robot, respectively.
For the 4-rotor UAV (subject #2), we design three field
scenarios and collect 100 execution traces for each scenario
due to battery constraints. In the first scenario, the UAV takes
off from a starting point and lands at a remote destination.
We collect 68 safe execution traces and 32 unsafe ones. In
the second scenario, the UAV carries some balancing weight
during its flying. We collect 71 safe execution traces and 29
unsafe ones. In the last scenario, the UAV conducts extra
actions in addition to its normal flying plans, e.g., hovering
and turning around. We collect 64 safe execution traces and
36 unsafe ones. Similarly, we use 4-UAV-s1, 4-UAV-s2, and
4-UAV-s3 to denote the three scenarios, respectively.
For the 6-rotor UAV (subject #3), similarly it is scheduled to
fly from a starting point to a remote destination. We collect 100
execution traces, including 76 safe executions and 24 unsafe
ones. We design one field scenario for experiments and use
6-UAV to denote this scenario.
Experimental procedure. With collected execution traces
from various scenarios, all the approaches under comparison
(i.e., CoMID, Daikon, and ZoomIn) generate invariants from
these traces, which are evaluated for their qualities, in order
to answer our three research questions. All the experiments
are conducted on a commodity PC with an Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7 CPU @4.2GHz and 32GB RAM. For each scenario, we
run CoMID, Daikon, and ZoomIn on safe execution traces
to generate invariants, respectively. Then we use safe and
unsafe execution traces to validate their generated invariants in
detecting abnormal states for the three experimental subjects.
We use 10-fold cross-validation in our experiments. More
specifically, for each scenario we divide the set of safe
execution traces into ten subsets of the same size. One subset
of safe execution traces (named the safe set) and the set of
unsafe execution traces (named the unsafe set) are retained for
validation. The remaining nine subsets of safe execution traces
are used for invariant generation. We repeat this generation and
validation process ten times and average their results as the
final results for discussion.
To answer research question RQ1 (effectiveness and
efficiency), we compare the invariants generated by the
three approaches. For each approach, we first study the
number of its generated invariants and the percentage of these
invariants that can also be generated by other approaches.
Since CoMID uses multi-invariant detection, we consider only
its principal invariants for a fair comparison. We then study
the effectiveness and efficiency of the invariants generated by
the three approaches in detecting abnormal states for cyber-
physical programs. We measure the effectiveness by the true-
positive rate (TP, i.e., the percentage of unsafe execution traces
that are predicted to be failing) for the unsafe set, and by the
false-positive rate (FP, i.e., the percentage of safe execution
traces that are predicted to be failing) for the safe set. Finally,
we compare the efficiency for the three approaches by their
time costs on invariant generation and checking.
To answer research question RQ2 (impact of configuration),
we study CoMID’s effectiveness (TP and FP) with its different
configurations enabled: (1) on whether to enable one or both
built-in technique(s) for improving the generated invariants,
i.e., enabling context-based trace grouping only (Context),
enabling multi-invariant detection only (Multi), or enabling
both techniques (CoMID); (2) on how to set up a DoS
threshold value for distinguishing program contexts in the
invariant generation, i.e., from 0.6 to 1.0 with a pace of 0.1
(0.8 as the default setting, as explained in Section III.A).
The first two research questions study the quality of
CoMID’s generated invariants based on offline execution
traces that have been collected in advance. Research question
RQ3 aims to study CoMID’s usefulness in the runtime
monitoring, i.e., investigating how its generated invariants
behave when monitoring the three experimental subjects’
online executions. Without CoMID-based runtime monitoring,
the three experimental subjects can rely on only their built-
in protection mechanisms when their corresponding failure
conditions are triggered. For example, when the robot is falling
into the ground, it would control to stop walking and crouch
on its knees; when a UAV is falling into the ground, it would
control to stop rotating its wings. Such protection mechanisms
can prevent the robot and UAVs from being damaged by the
failures, but their planned tasks already fail. With CoMID-
based runtime monitoring, the three experimental subjects can
take remedy mechanisms in advance once CoMID detects
abnormal states (i.e., predicting the current execution to be
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TABLE I
OVERVIEWOF THE GENERATED INVARIANTS BY THE THREE APPROACHES
CoMID Daikon ZoomIn
Inv TP (%) FP (%) Inv TP (%) FP (%) Inv TP (%) FP (%)
NAO-f 1,157 (33.0%) 85.9 18.3 978 (39.1%) 68.6 56.0 979 (38.0%) 78.5 43.9
NAO-e 1,313 (32.4%) 90.3 13.9 1,117 (38.1%) 79.1 44.0 1,117 (38.1%) 84.6 33.9
4-UAV-s1 860 (39.0%) 95.0 15.6 577 (58.1%) 77.5 40.0 577 (58.1%) 84.3 27.2
4-UAV-s2 802 (36.3%) 93.9 7.1 570 (51.1%) 65.7 30.7 570 (51.1%) 79.1 17.2
4-UAV-s3 933 (30.2%) 90.8 29.1 609 (46.3%) 75.5 49.4 609 (46.3%) 80.6 35.9
6-UAV 1,803 (33.0%) 92.0 12.2 1,527 (39.0%) 83.4 30.7 1,527 (39.0%) 85.9 18.9
failing). For example, the robot would stop walking, stand for
two seconds, and then walk toward a different direction; a UAV
would stop landing, reinitiate the flying plan, and then seek
to land after two seconds. Although such remedy mechanisms
can delay the subjects’ planned tasks, they should be able to
help avoid upcoming failures that would otherwise occur if no
remedy mechanism is taken. We study CoMID’s usefulness by
comparing the difference between using and not using CoMID-
based runtime monitoring.
To answer RQ3 (usefulness), we study how CoMID-based
runtime monitoring helps the three experimental subjects on
preventing their failures. The failure data without CoMID-
based runtime monitoring can be obtained from earlier
collected execution traces for the three experimental subjects
in answering RQ1 and RQ2. For obtaining the failure data
with CoMID-based runtime monitoring, we run the three
experimental subjects enabled with CoMID-based runtime
monitoring and remedy mechanisms 100 times for each
scenario, and average their results. Then we can calculate
and compare the success rates for the three experimental
subjects from the failure data. In addition, since the remedy
mechanisms can delay the subjects’ planned tasks, we study
their impact by measuring and comparing the subjects’ task-
completion time (i.e., when a robot finishes its exploration
task, and a UAV finishes its flying and landing tasks) for those
non-failure executions.
C. Experimental Results and Analyses
RQ1 (effectiveness and efficiency). Table I gives an
overview of our experimental results on the quality of
the generated invariants by the three approaches under
comparison. It includes the number of generated invariants
(Inv), true positive rate (TP) in detecting abnormal states
for the unsafe set, and false positive rate (FP) in detecting
abnormal states for the safe set. The percentage data in
brackets after the invariant numbers give the proportions of
the concerned invariants that can also be generated by other
approaches. In general, CoMID generates more invariants
than Daikon and ZoomIn (17.5–53.2% more, for different
scenarios), even if we consider its principal invariants only.
This is because CoMID generates different invariants to govern
the program behavior for different situations by distinguishing
different program and environmental contexts. Daikon and
ZoomIn generate the same numbers of invariants since ZoomIn
internally uses Daikon as its invariant inference engine,
although they check these invariants in different ways in the
runtime monitoring, as we show later.
Besides, we observe that the invariants generated by CoMID
are quite different from those generated by the other two
approaches. For example, 30.2–39.0% of CoMID’s invariants
can be generated by the other two approaches, but 38.1–
58.1% of the other two approaches’ invariants can also
be generated by CoMID. Considering that the number of
CoMID’s generated invariants is larger than those of the
other two approaches’ generated invariants, this suggests that
CoMID generates much more invariants that are unique from
those generated by the other two approaches.
It is important to know whether these unique invariants bring
the positive or negative impact on detecting abnormal states for
the three experimental subjects. We observe from the Table I
that these unique invariants enable CoMID to achieve a higher
TP and a lower FP. For example, CoMID’s TP is 8.6–28.2%
higher than Daikon and 5.7–14.7% higher than ZoomIn, and at
the same time, CoMID’s FP is 18.6–37.6% lower than Daikon
and 6.8–25.5% lower than ZoomIn. A high TP implies the
ability of capturing various cases of abnormal states, and at
the same time, a low FP implies that this ability is not achieved
by the cost of overfitting the generated invariants to specific
cases. Therefore, this result suggests that CoMID’s generated
invariants are of a high quality, by achieving both a high TP
and a low FP. It also indicates that CoMID deserves its efforts
on particularly addressing the iterative execution and uncertain
interaction characteristics of cyber-physical programs. For the
iterative execution, ZoomIn partially uses program contexts to
distinguish different scopes for different invariants, and thus
performs better than Daikon, which does not consider any
context at all. For the uncertain interaction, different levels of
uncertainty result in CoMID’s varying leading advantages in
FP for different experimental subjects. For example, compared
with ZoomIn, CoMID achieves a 20.0–25.5% lower FP for the
NAO robot, and a 6.8–11.2% lower FP for the two UAVs. The
differences are due to the fact that the NAO robot suffers more
uncertainty (e.g., installed more types of sensors) than the two
UAVs.
We then compare the efficiency for the three approaches
in generating invariants and checking these invariants for
detecting abnormal states. Fig. 8-a compares these approaches’
time costs in generating invariants. We observe that CoMID
spends 18.7–43.6% more time than Daikon and 8.9–23.5%
more than ZoomIn in generating invariants. Daikon spends
the least time due to its straightforward strategy of invariant
generation by overlooking all contexts. CoMID’s higher time
cost is due to its constituent techniques of context-based trace
grouping and multi-invariant generation for improving the
11
0.0
40.0
80.0
120.0
160.0
200.0
NAO-f NAO-e 4-UAV-s1 4-UAV-s2 4-UAV-s3 6-UAV
CoMID Daikon ZoomInTime (min.) 
(a) For generating invariants
0.0
200.0
400.0
600.0
800.0
NAO-f NAO-e 4-UAV-s1 4-UAV-s2 4-UAV-s3 6-UAV
CoMID Daikon ZoomInTime (ms.) 
(b) For checking invariants
Fig. 7. Efficiency comparison for CoMID, Daikon, and ZoomIn
quality of generated invariants. For the former, CoMID groups
context-sharing iterations to make its generated invariants fitter
to specific program behaviors, bringing up its TP in detecting
abnormal states. For the latter, CoMID uses multiple invariants
to alleviate the impact of uncertainty, bringing down its FP in
detecting abnormal states.
Fig. 8-b compares the three approaches’ time costs in
checking invariants for runtime monitoring. We observe that
CoMID spends 36.3–88.5% less time than Daikon. Although
CoMID uses multiple invariants to decide abnormal states,
its context-based trace grouping technique enables it to focus
on much fewer invariants specific for each iteration a cyber-
physical program encounters. Daikon, instead, has to check
each invariant in each iteration, resulting in its high time
cost in detecting abnormal states. Regarding ZoomIn, it uses
only statement-coverage information to select invariants for
checking in each iteration, resulting in its lowest time cost
(no other overhead), but still comparable to CoMID’s time
cost, as shown in Fig. 8-b.
Therefore, we answer research question RQ1 as follows.
CoMID generates and checks invariants to detect
abnormal states for cyber-physical programs effectively and
efficiently. It achieves a higher TP (5.7–28.2% higher) and
a lower FP (6.8–37.6% lower) than Daikon and ZoomIn.
Although it spends more time in generating invariants
(offline), its invariant checking (online) is comparably
efficient as ZoomIn and much more efficient than Daikon.
RQ2 (impact of configuration). We study the impact of
configurations on CoMID’s effectiveness from two lines. First,
CoMID can be configured with its two built-in techniques
(context-based trace grouping and multi-invariant detection)
individually enabled. Fig. 8 compares the effectiveness in
terms of TP and FP for the original CoMID (CoMID), CoMID
with only context-based trace grouping enabled (Context), and
CoMID with only multi-invariant detection enabled (Multi).
We observe that when detecting abnormal states for the unsafe
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Fig. 8. Effectiveness comparison for CoMID, Context, and Multi
set, Context performs more effectively than Multi in four
UAV scenarios (5.7–23.6% higher TP), while Multi performs
more effectively than Context in two NAO scenarios (2.3–
5.7% higher TP). As analyzed earlier, the NAO robot suffers
more uncertainty than the two UAVs due to its complicated
sensing and physical behavior, and thus Multi helps more
than Context for the two NAO scenarios on suppressing the
impact of uncertainty. For the four UAV-related scenarios,
their uncertainty is relatively lighter, and thus Context exhibits
more significant advantages. Of course, when combining the
two techniques together, CoMID always produces the best
results (9.2–49.5% higher TP). On the other hand, when
suppressing false alarms for the safe set, Multi performs more
effectively than Context in four scenarios (5.0–13.3% lower
FP), and Context performs more effectively than Multi in the
other two scenarios (2.5–10.4% lower FP). The differences
are mainly caused by different levels of uncertainty in the
respective scenarios. Still, CoMID again produces the best
results (0.1–23.5% lower FP). Considering that Context and
Multi behave better in different scenarios (complementing
each other) and CoMID always produces the best results,
CoMID’s two techniques (context-based trace grouping and
multi-invariant detection) are both useful for improving its
effectiveness by achieving a high TP and a low FP.
Second, CoMID can also be configured to use different DoS
threshold values for distinguishing different program contexts
in generating invariants. As mentioned earlier, CoMID uses a
default DoS threshold value of 0.8 as suggested by existing
work [24], and here we study the impact of this value choice
(from 0.6 to 1.0 with a pace of 0.1) on CoMID’s effectiveness.
Fig. 9 compares CoMID’s effectiveness in terms of TP and
FP with different DoS threshold values. We observe that in all
six scenarios, CoMID with the value of 0.8 indeed behaves
the best in both TP and FP. Nevertheless, the winning extents
are not that large, and the extent on TP (1.8–15.6% higher)
is a bit more than that on FP (0.1–7.9% lower). In addition,
we observe that the impact of different DoS threshold values
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Fig. 9. Effectiveness comparison for CoMID with different DoS threshold
values
varies across different scenarios. For example, in scenario
NAO-f, the TP for threshold 0.9 behaves slightly better than
that for threshold 0.7, while in scenario NAO-e, the latter
behaves slightly better than the former. This result suggests
that CoMID’s effectiveness might be further improved if its
DoS threshold value can be tuned adaptively for specific
cyber-physical programs. Currently, we make CoMID take the
default value of 0.8 for simplicity, and we leave its adaptive
tuning to future work.
Therefore, we answer research question RQ2 as follows.
CoMID’s configurations affect its effectiveness. First,
CoMID’s two built-in techniques are both useful. When the
uncertainty affecting the experimental subjects is relatively
light, CoMID with only context-based trace grouping
enabled already behaves quite well. When the uncertainty is
relatively heavy, CoMID with only multi-invariant detection
enabled behaves better. In either way, combing both
techniques (i.e., a fully-fledged CoMID) produces the best
results. Second, CoMID’s setting of its DoS threshold value
for distinguishing different program contexts also affects
its effectiveness, but not significantly. Its current default
value of 0.8 already makes it work satisfactorily for the
experimental subjects.
RQ3 (usefulness). Finally, we study how CoMID-based
runtime monitoring helps the three experimental subjects
on preventing their potential failures. Fig. 10 compares
the success rate for the three experimental subjects in
the six scenarios, based on their failure data with (“with
CoMID”) and without (“without CoMID”) CoMID-based
runtime monitoring. We observe that CoMID indeed helps
improve the success rate by 15.3–31.7% (avg. 23.1%) across
different scenarios. This result echoes our earlier experimental
results on CoMID’s high TP and low FP performance. In
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Fig. 10. Success rate for monitored cyber-physical programs
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Fig. 11. Average task-completion time for monitored cyber-physical programs
addition, as mentioned earlier, the CoMID-based runtime
monitoring and remedy mechanisms can delay the three
experimental subjects’ planned tasks, thus trading for higher
safety (i.e., fewer failures). So we study such impact. Fig. 11
compares the average task-completion time for non-failure
executions of the three experimental subjects with (“with
CoMID”) and without (“without CoMID”) CoMID-based
runtime monitoring. We observe that CoMID indeed increases
the subjects’ task-completion time by 8.8–35.2% (avg. 26.8%).
We consider such slowdown extent acceptable for subjects that
require high safety assurance. In fact, the delay is largely due
to the safety control before reinitializing the tasks (e.g., a robot
stands for two seconds and then restarts walking, and a UAV
restarts to land after two seconds), which is customizable by
different application domains.
Therefore, we answer research question RQ3 as follows.
CoMID’s capability of generating and checking invariants
for runtime monitoring can effectively prevent the
experimental subjects from entering potential failures.
CoMID helps improve the subjects’ success rate in their
task executions by 15.3–31.7%, with a cost of 8.8–35.2%
longer task-completion time.
D. Threats to Validity
One major concern on the validity of our experimental
conclusions is the selection of experimental subjects in our
evaluation. We select only three experimental subjects, which
may not allow our conclusions to be generalized to more other
subjects. Nevertheless, a comprehensive evaluation requires
the support of suitable environments for experiments, which
should be both observable and controllable. This requirement
restricts our choice of possible experimental subjects. To
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alleviate this threat, we try to make our subjects realistic
by selecting real-world cyber-physical programs. Besides,
we make the subjects diverse by requesting them to cover
different functionalities (e.g., automated area exploration,
planned flying, and smart obstacle avoidance), and to run on
different platforms (e.g., Python-based NAO robot, Java-based
UAV, and C-based UAV). By doing so, we try to alleviate
as much as possible potential threat to the external validity
of our experimental conclusions. Still, evaluating CoMID on
more comprehensive cyber-physical programs and platforms
deserves further efforts.
Another concern is about relating the detection of an
abnormal state to an execution’s failure result; such factor may
pose threat to internal validity of our experimental conclusions
on an approach’s TP and FP performance. The reason is
that when an abnormal state is detected by an approach,
one seems not able to clearly relate the detection to the
current execution’s upcoming failure, considering that their
time interval can vary. To address this problem, we particularly
design to measure TP for unsafe executions and FP for safe
executions only: (1) for an unsafe execution, if an approach
never detects any abnormal state, such result suggests its
weakness (it should detect), and so we choose to check
whether the approach reports the detection of any abnormal
state, i.e., TP; (2) on the other hand, for a safe execution,
if an approach reports the detection of any abnormal state,
such result also suggests its weakness (it should not detect),
and so we directly check whether the approach produces
such false alarms, i.e., FP. In addition, to further alleviate
the potential threat, we additionally study in research question
RQ3 whether CoMID-based runtime monitoring indeed helps
prevent the experimental subjects from entering failures, i.e.,
by measuring and comparing their success rates in task
executions. All together, we strive our best efforts to evaluate
CoMID’s experimental and practical usefulness for cyber-
physical programs.
V. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss representative related work in
recent years, on testing cyber-physical programs, generating
program invariants, and runtime monitoring, respectively.
Testing cyber-physical programs. Cyber-physical pro-
grams are featured with context-awareness, adaptability, and
uncertain program-environmental interactions, which bring
substantial challenges to their quality assurance. To address
this problem, various techniques have been proposed for
effective testing of such programs. For example, Fredericks et
al. [32] used utility functions to guide the design and evolution
of test cases for cyber-physical programs. Xu et al. [13]
proposed monitoring common error patterns at the runtime of
cyber-physical programs, to identify defects in their adaptation
logics when interacting with uncertain environments. Ramires
et al. [33] explored specific combinations of environmental
conditions to trigger specification-violating behaviors in
adaptive systems. Yi et al. [34] presented a white-box
sampling-based approach to systematically exploring the state
space of an adaptive program, by filtering out unnecessary
space samplings whose explorations would not contribute to
detecting program faults. These pieces of work exploited
different observations to strengthen their testing effectiveness,
but relied mostly on human-written or domain-specific
properties for defining abnormal or error states in executing
programs. Our CoMID approach complements such work by
assisting their fault-detection capabilities from checking trivial
failure conditions (e.g., system crashes) to comprehensive
errors (e.g., various types of error state) with automatically
generated invariants.
Generating program invariants. Invariants play an impor-
tant role in program analysis and runtime monitoring towards
the quality assurance for programs with complex logics. As
a representative approach of automated invariant generation,
Daikon [16] inferred pre-conditions and post-conditions for
methods executed in a program, by collecting program
execution information and using pre-defined templates to
derive invariants from the collected information. DySy [35]
followed a similar way and used branch conditions to
derive more types of invariants. Eclat [36] took automated
invariant generation one step further, by learning a model
from assumed executions and identifying inputs that do not
match the learned model. Jiang et al. [4] derived invariants
by observing messages exchanged between system nodes, and
specified operational attributes for robotic systems based on
these messages. Zhang et al. [37] used symbolic execution
as a feedback mechanism to refine the set of candidate
invariants generated by Daikon. Carzaniga et al. [38] proposed
cross-checking invariant-alike oracles by exploiting intrinsic
redundancy of software systems. Different from these pieces
of existing work, our CoMID approach additionally considers
the impact of contexts on invariant generation (to restrict
invariants’ effective scopes) and that of uncertainty on
invariant checking (to suppress false alarms), specially catered
for the characteristics of cyber-physical programs.
Runtime monitoring. By means of invariant checking, one
is able to detect abnormal states or anomalous behaviors in
a program’s execution and take remedy actions if necessary,
thus helping improve the program’s quality at runtime. For
example, Zheng et al. [39] mined predicate rules that specify
what must hold at certain program points (e.g., branches
and exit points) for runtime monitoring. Raz et al. [40]
derived constraints on values returned by data sources, and
identified abnormal values based on the derived constraints.
Pastore et al. [24] used the statement-coverage information in
a program’s execution to improve the precision of abnormality
detection. Nadi et al. [41] extracted configuration constraints
from program code, and used the constraints to enforce
expected runtime behaviors. Xu et al. [42] collected the calling
contexts of method invocations, and used the contexts to
distinguish a program’s different behaviors under different
scenarios. These pieces of work shared a common assumption
that a program execution’s anomalous behaviors can be
discovered by checking newly collected execution data against
earlier derived constraints from assumed normal executions.
While this assumption is generally correct, cyber-physical
programs’ two characteristics, i.e., iterative execution and
uncertain interaction as discussed earlier, make these pieces of
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work less effective. The main reason is that different iterations
in a cyber-physical program’s execution can face different
situations and undertake different strategies to handle these
situations. Then a straightforward invariant-checking approach
can easily generate false alarms when the derived invariants’
scopes differ and the impact of uncertainty is overlooked. Our
CoMID approach specifically addresses this problem and thus
complements existing work on effective runtime monitoring.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this article, we present a novel approach, CoMID,
for effectively generating and checking invariants to de-
tect abnormal states for cyber-physical programs. CoMID
distinguishes different contexts for invariants and makes
them context-aware, so that its generated invariants can be
effective for varying situations and at the same time robust to
uncontrollable uncertainty faced by cyber-physical programs.
Our experimental evaluation with real-world cyber-physical
programs validates CoMID’s effectiveness in improving the
true-positive rate and reducing the false-positive rate in
detecting abnormal states, as compared with two state-of-the-
art invariant generation approaches.
CoMID still has room for improvement. For example, it
currently relies on pre-decided models about the uncertainty
distribution a cyber-physical program experiences in its
multi-invariant detection. We plan to relax this requirement
and explore dynamic calibration techniques to refine such
uncertainty models in order to support more application
scenarios in future. Besides, CoMID currently uses the default
DoS threshold value of 0.8 as suggested by existing work [24].
In experiments, we observe the opportunities in which different
threshold values can bring higher runtime monitoring qualities
for different scenarios. Therefore, it is also worth exploring
how to design adaptive DoS threshold tuning for further
refined invariant generation and checking. We are working
along these lines.
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